The District Court's Remarkable Order Striking Down the NSL Statute
March 18, 2013 | By Matt Zimmerman
In Depth: The District Court's Remarkable Order Striking Down the NSL Statute
On Friday, EFF received the long-awaiting ruling on its 2011 petition to set aside a National Security Letter (NSL) issued to a telecommunications company. The petition challenged the constitutionality of one of five national security letter statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 2709. And what a ruling it was. In a detailed and careful 24-page opinion, Judge Susan Illston of the district court for the Northern District of California methodically addressed the government's attempted justifications for this controversial domestic surveillance tool and found that the statute failed to meet the standards of settled First Amendment law.
First, a moment to underscore the importance of this ruling. Over the past decade, since the PATRIOT Act expanded its reach from foreign agents and spies to anyone whose information may be "relevant" to a national security investigation, the FBI has issued hundreds of thousands of NSLs seeking potentially intimate information about Americans. Supporters of NSLs have frequently attempted to discount privacy concerns and have characterized criticism as "hyperbole," but the reality is very different. As Judge Victor Marrero of the Southern District of New York noted in his 2004 Doe v. Ashcroft NSL decision, the NSL statute grants enormous, unchecked power to pry into the private lives of people within the United States:
The FBI theoretically could issue to a political campaign's computer systems operator a § 2709 NSL compelling production of the names of all persons who have email addresses through the campaign's computer systems. The FBI theoretically could also issue an NSL under § 2709 to discern the identity of someone whose anonymous online web log, or “blog,” is critical of the Government.
Any statutory structure that grants the executive branch such power and couples that power with the ability to hide its behavior from scrutiny is ripe for abuse. And as we know, based on a series of internal investigations ordered by Congress, this abuse has occurred with NSLs.
With Friday's opinion, entitled In Re National Security Letter, not only did the court set aside this particular letter, it barred any NSLs to telecommunications providers, finding that the statute was so inherently flawed that it could not stand. The decision will likely be appealed, and the order has been stayed in order to give the government the time to file an appeal, but the federal district court deserves enormous credit for not shying away from EFF's request and instead tackling most of the difficult issues head on.
With this case, EFF follows in the strong footsteps of our friends at the ACLU. In 2008, on behalf of Nicholas Merrill, the ACLU succeeded in convincing both a district court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to acknowledge the serious structural problems with the NSL statute. Unfortunately, despite finding the statute unconstitutional, the Second Circuit in its Doe v. Mukasey opinion approved the continued use of NSLs if the FBI undertook certain voluntary measures aimed at curbing abuse.
The district court here found similar constitutional flaws but took those problems to their rightful conclusion. The court flatly rejected the Second Circuit's attempts to rewrite the statute and rely on voluntary FBI actions to fix it, instead striking it down. While the decision rested primarily on failings with the gag provision, the court ruled that that provision was not severable from the rest of the statute and struck the statute in its entirety. As a result, if the decision is upheld, Congress must step in and repair the structural defects to better protect First Amendment rights if it intends to continue to grant similar power to the FBI.
The court made five critical findings. First, Judge Illston quickly rejected the government's dangerous argument that NSL recipients had no power to review the constitutionality of the statute. The government had suggested that the court could only review specific problems with specific NSLs, meaning that larger structural problems with the statute would remain untouched. As the court correctly noted, however, the statute specifically allows a court to determine whether an NSL is "unreasonable" or "unlawful" which includes determining whether the statute itself is unconstitutional.
Second, the district court found that the statute impermissibly authorizes the FBI to limit speech without constitutionally-mandated procedural protections. The Supreme Court articulated the scope for such protections in 1965 in Freedman vs. Maryland, a case in which it struck down a Maryland licensing scheme that required films to be submitted to a government ratings board prior to public showings. The problem with the statute wasn't necessarily its substantive reach as it was possible that films could be banned without violating the First Amendment -- if, for example, they met the First Amendment definition of "obscene." Instead, the court was concerned that the procedures for challenging a ban stacked the deck against theater owners. As the Freedman Court said at the time:
Because the censor's business is to censor, there inheres the danger that he may well be less responsive than a court -- part of an independent branch of government -- to the constitutionally protected interests in free expression. And if it is made unduly onerous, by reason of delay or otherwise, to seek judicial review, the censor's determination may in practice be final.
Accordingly, where speech is conditioned on first obtaining permission from the government, a statute must be designed to ensure that any person who is gagged gets a quick, fair opportunity to challenge that decision. Specifically, the Freedman Court required that:
the burden must fall on the government to go to court to obtain approval for any gag
any pre-review gag must be strictly limited in time, and
the time in which a reviewing court must make its determination must be set to "short fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution."
The NSL statute plainly fails the Freedman test: the FBI can gag an NSL recipient on its own and without any judicial review, the statute does not force the government to initiate the review in the event that a recipient objects, and there are no requirements that a challenge be promptly heard or evaluated. Just as in the Freedman case, the district court here noted that the FBI was inclined to gag NSL recipients and the statute improperly stacked the deck against NSL recipients if they chose to challenge the gag.
Third, the court here also found that the statute must meet and failed to meet the exacting "strict scrutiny" standard required of statutes that restrict speech based on their content. Strict scrutiny requires that the government's gag be "narrowly tailored" to meet its needs, but the court held that even if the government's motivations were sound, it prohibited speech too broadly to meet those goals:
The problem … is that the statute does nothing to account for the fact that when no such national security concerns exist, thousands of recipients of NSLs are nonetheless prohibited from speaking out about the mere fact of their receipt of an NSL, rendering the statute impermissibly over broad and not narrowly tailored.
The court also noted that the statute was overly broad in that it authorized gags of indefinite length, regardless of any actual specific need over time.
Fourth, the district court found that the statute was not "severable," meaning that Congress designed the NSL tool as a whole and that the powers it granted to the FBI were not intended to function separately if one of the powers was found to be unconstitutional. Because the nondisclosure provision was found to be unconstitutional on its face, the power to compel the disclosure of customer records must also fall. NSL statistics are consistent with this observation: 97% of all NSLs are delivered with a gag order.
Finally, the district court found that, regardless of other failings, the statute's standard of review violated separation of powers principles by forcing the courts to defer to the FBI's determinations and preventing independent review. It noted that a "[c]ourt can only sustain nondisclosure based on a searching standard of review." While courts do largely defer to the executive branch's judgment in national security matters, the standard in this statute required the court to consider the government's decision "conclusive" and only allowing the court to consider whether it was made in "bad faith." The court rightly noted that real judicial review requires more.
The court did not adopt all of EFF's arguments. Under the Supreme Court's plurality holding in New York Times v. United States -- the famous "Pentagon Papers" case -- prior restraints in the national security context may only be justified if the disclosure of certain information "will surely result indirect, immediate, and irreparable harm to our Nation or its people," demonstrated by a showing of specific evidence to a court. EFF noted that the NSL statute permits the imposition of gags if the FBI certifies on its own that disclosure "may" result in some unspecified "harm" to a law enforcement investigation, a standard far below that of the Pentagon Papers case. Concluding that the prior restraint imposed by the NSL statute did not amount to a "classic" prior restraint, however, Judge Illston held that such standards would be "extraordinarily rigorous" and "too exacting."
The district court also did not address EFF's argument that the statute granted too much unbounded discretion to the FBI. Even if discretion is properly vested in a government agency to make certain evaluations, that evaluation must be constrained by "narrow, objective, and definite standards" so that the court can evaluate whether an agency like the FBI exceeds its authority. Once again, the NSL statute authorizes the FBI to gag NSL recipients whenever, in its view, a disclosure “may” result in a harm to national security or interfere with a criminal investigation. This language is subjective and sweeping, giving a court no practical ability to evaluate whether the FBI is properly exercising -- or exceeding -- its authority. As the court struck down the nondisclosure provision on other grounds, it did not reach this separate ground.
Finally, Judge Illston also declined to address another critical flaw argued by EFF: that the ability to obtain without court supervision the subscriber records of telecommunications customers -- such as an unidentified Internet poster's identity or a known individual's "calling circle" -- potentially violated the First Amendment rights to anonymous speech and association of subscribers. Without court approval ahead of time, victims of FBI overreach could never be made whole since the privacy rights at stake could never be reconstructed. However, Judge Illston struck down the records provision on severability grounds because of the fatal wound imposed by the unconstitutional gag provision instead of addressing the matter directly.
The In Re National Security Letter order is a major victory, first for EFF's anonymous client who we congratulate for its courage, sense of civic responsibility, and determination to stand up for the privacy rights of its customers. While many people have identified the unfairness and injustice of the NSL statute, exceedingly few demonstrated the courage to stand up and take on the power of the national security apparatus of the United States government. Indeed, as we have previously reported, the government shockingly responded to EFF's challenge by suing our client, claiming that by "stat[ing] its objection to compliance with the provisions of" the NSL by "exercis[ing] its rights under" the NSL statute to challenge the NSL's legality, EFF's client was "interfer[ing] with the United States' vindication of its sovereign interests in law enforcement, counterintelligence, and protecting national security."
Of course while this decision is a major victory, it is likely also a preliminary one. Because of the stay of the ruling, our client still cannot identify itself and participate more fully in the public debate about NSLs. EFF is gearing up for the likely appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and, possibly, to the Supreme Court. But that shouldn't stop us from taking a moment to celebrate and to remember that over-reaching national security powers can be challenged and challenged successfully.
Free Speech
Privacy
National Security Letters
Related Cases
In re: 2011 National Security Letter
In Depth: The District Court's Remarkable Order Striking Down the NSL Statute
On Friday, EFF received the long-awaiting ruling on its 2011 petition to set aside a National Security Letter (NSL) issued to a telecommunications company. The petition challenged the constitutionality of one of five national security letter statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 2709. And what a ruling it was. In a detailed and careful 24-page opinion, Judge Susan Illston of the district court for the Northern District of California methodically addressed the government's attempted justifications for this controversial domestic surveillance tool and found that the statute failed to meet the standards of settled First Amendment law.
First, a moment to underscore the importance of this ruling. Over the past decade, since the PATRIOT Act expanded its reach from foreign agents and spies to anyone whose information may be "relevant" to a national security investigation, the FBI has issued hundreds of thousands of NSLs seeking potentially intimate information about Americans. Supporters of NSLs have frequently attempted to discount privacy concerns and have characterized criticism as "hyperbole," but the reality is very different. As Judge Victor Marrero of the Southern District of New York noted in his 2004 Doe v. Ashcroft NSL decision, the NSL statute grants enormous, unchecked power to pry into the private lives of people within the United States:
The FBI theoretically could issue to a political campaign's computer systems operator a § 2709 NSL compelling production of the names of all persons who have email addresses through the campaign's computer systems. The FBI theoretically could also issue an NSL under § 2709 to discern the identity of someone whose anonymous online web log, or “blog,” is critical of the Government.
Any statutory structure that grants the executive branch such power and couples that power with the ability to hide its behavior from scrutiny is ripe for abuse. And as we know, based on a series of internal investigations ordered by Congress, this abuse has occurred with NSLs.
With Friday's opinion, entitled In Re National Security Letter, not only did the court set aside this particular letter, it barred any NSLs to telecommunications providers, finding that the statute was so inherently flawed that it could not stand. The decision will likely be appealed, and the order has been stayed in order to give the government the time to file an appeal, but the federal district court deserves enormous credit for not shying away from EFF's request and instead tackling most of the difficult issues head on.
With this case, EFF follows in the strong footsteps of our friends at the ACLU. In 2008, on behalf of Nicholas Merrill, the ACLU succeeded in convincing both a district court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to acknowledge the serious structural problems with the NSL statute. Unfortunately, despite finding the statute unconstitutional, the Second Circuit in its Doe v. Mukasey opinion approved the continued use of NSLs if the FBI undertook certain voluntary measures aimed at curbing abuse.
The district court here found similar constitutional flaws but took those problems to their rightful conclusion. The court flatly rejected the Second Circuit's attempts to rewrite the statute and rely on voluntary FBI actions to fix it, instead striking it down. While the decision rested primarily on failings with the gag provision, the court ruled that that provision was not severable from the rest of the statute and struck the statute in its entirety. As a result, if the decision is upheld, Congress must step in and repair the structural defects to better protect First Amendment rights if it intends to continue to grant similar power to the FBI.
The court made five critical findings. First, Judge Illston quickly rejected the government's dangerous argument that NSL recipients had no power to review the constitutionality of the statute. The government had suggested that the court could only review specific problems with specific NSLs, meaning that larger structural problems with the statute would remain untouched. As the court correctly noted, however, the statute specifically allows a court to determine whether an NSL is "unreasonable" or "unlawful" which includes determining whether the statute itself is unconstitutional.
Second, the district court found that the statute impermissibly authorizes the FBI to limit speech without constitutionally-mandated procedural protections. The Supreme Court articulated the scope for such protections in 1965 in Freedman vs. Maryland, a case in which it struck down a Maryland licensing scheme that required films to be submitted to a government ratings board prior to public showings. The problem with the statute wasn't necessarily its substantive reach as it was possible that films could be banned without violating the First Amendment -- if, for example, they met the First Amendment definition of "obscene." Instead, the court was concerned that the procedures for challenging a ban stacked the deck against theater owners. As the Freedman Court said at the time:
Because the censor's business is to censor, there inheres the danger that he may well be less responsive than a court -- part of an independent branch of government -- to the constitutionally protected interests in free expression. And if it is made unduly onerous, by reason of delay or otherwise, to seek judicial review, the censor's determination may in practice be final.
Accordingly, where speech is conditioned on first obtaining permission from the government, a statute must be designed to ensure that any person who is gagged gets a quick, fair opportunity to challenge that decision. Specifically, the Freedman Court required that:
the burden must fall on the government to go to court to obtain approval for any gag
any pre-review gag must be strictly limited in time, and
the time in which a reviewing court must make its determination must be set to "short fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution."
The NSL statute plainly fails the Freedman test: the FBI can gag an NSL recipient on its own and without any judicial review, the statute does not force the government to initiate the review in the event that a recipient objects, and there are no requirements that a challenge be promptly heard or evaluated. Just as in the Freedman case, the district court here noted that the FBI was inclined to gag NSL recipients and the statute improperly stacked the deck against NSL recipients if they chose to challenge the gag.
Third, the court here also found that the statute must meet and failed to meet the exacting "strict scrutiny" standard required of statutes that restrict speech based on their content. Strict scrutiny requires that the government's gag be "narrowly tailored" to meet its needs, but the court held that even if the government's motivations were sound, it prohibited speech too broadly to meet those goals:
The problem … is that the statute does nothing to account for the fact that when no such national security concerns exist, thousands of recipients of NSLs are nonetheless prohibited from speaking out about the mere fact of their receipt of an NSL, rendering the statute impermissibly over broad and not narrowly tailored.
The court also noted that the statute was overly broad in that it authorized gags of indefinite length, regardless of any actual specific need over time.
Fourth, the district court found that the statute was not "severable," meaning that Congress designed the NSL tool as a whole and that the powers it granted to the FBI were not intended to function separately if one of the powers was found to be unconstitutional. Because the nondisclosure provision was found to be unconstitutional on its face, the power to compel the disclosure of customer records must also fall. NSL statistics are consistent with this observation: 97% of all NSLs are delivered with a gag order.
Finally, the district court found that, regardless of other failings, the statute's standard of review violated separation of powers principles by forcing the courts to defer to the FBI's determinations and preventing independent review. It noted that a "[c]ourt can only sustain nondisclosure based on a searching standard of review." While courts do largely defer to the executive branch's judgment in national security matters, the standard in this statute required the court to consider the government's decision "conclusive" and only allowing the court to consider whether it was made in "bad faith." The court rightly noted that real judicial review requires more.
The court did not adopt all of EFF's arguments. Under the Supreme Court's plurality holding in New York Times v. United States -- the famous "Pentagon Papers" case -- prior restraints in the national security context may only be justified if the disclosure of certain information "will surely result indirect, immediate, and irreparable harm to our Nation or its people," demonstrated by a showing of specific evidence to a court. EFF noted that the NSL statute permits the imposition of gags if the FBI certifies on its own that disclosure "may" result in some unspecified "harm" to a law enforcement investigation, a standard far below that of the Pentagon Papers case. Concluding that the prior restraint imposed by the NSL statute did not amount to a "classic" prior restraint, however, Judge Illston held that such standards would be "extraordinarily rigorous" and "too exacting."
The district court also did not address EFF's argument that the statute granted too much unbounded discretion to the FBI. Even if discretion is properly vested in a government agency to make certain evaluations, that evaluation must be constrained by "narrow, objective, and definite standards" so that the court can evaluate whether an agency like the FBI exceeds its authority. Once again, the NSL statute authorizes the FBI to gag NSL recipients whenever, in its view, a disclosure “may” result in a harm to national security or interfere with a criminal investigation. This language is subjective and sweeping, giving a court no practical ability to evaluate whether the FBI is properly exercising -- or exceeding -- its authority. As the court struck down the nondisclosure provision on other grounds, it did not reach this separate ground.
Finally, Judge Illston also declined to address another critical flaw argued by EFF: that the ability to obtain without court supervision the subscriber records of telecommunications customers -- such as an unidentified Internet poster's identity or a known individual's "calling circle" -- potentially violated the First Amendment rights to anonymous speech and association of subscribers. Without court approval ahead of time, victims of FBI overreach could never be made whole since the privacy rights at stake could never be reconstructed. However, Judge Illston struck down the records provision on severability grounds because of the fatal wound imposed by the unconstitutional gag provision instead of addressing the matter directly.
The In Re National Security Letter order is a major victory, first for EFF's anonymous client who we congratulate for its courage, sense of civic responsibility, and determination to stand up for the privacy rights of its customers. While many people have identified the unfairness and injustice of the NSL statute, exceedingly few demonstrated the courage to stand up and take on the power of the national security apparatus of the United States government. Indeed, as we have previously reported, the government shockingly responded to EFF's challenge by suing our client, claiming that by "stat[ing] its objection to compliance with the provisions of" the NSL by "exercis[ing] its rights under" the NSL statute to challenge the NSL's legality, EFF's client was "interfer[ing] with the United States' vindication of its sovereign interests in law enforcement, counterintelligence, and protecting national security."
Of course while this decision is a major victory, it is likely also a preliminary one. Because of the stay of the ruling, our client still cannot identify itself and participate more fully in the public debate about NSLs. EFF is gearing up for the likely appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and, possibly, to the Supreme Court. But that shouldn't stop us from taking a moment to celebrate and to remember that over-reaching national security powers can be challenged and challenged successfully.
Free Speech
Privacy
National Security Letters
Related Cases
In re: 2011 National Security Letter
18 Марта 2013 Года | Matt Zimmerman
В Глубине: Районный Суд Замечательный Того, поразив в NSL статут В пятницу, EFF получил долгожданный управления на его 2011 ходатайство отложить Национальной Безопасности Письмо (NSL), выпущенные для телекоммуникационной компании. Ходатайство оспаривал конституционность один из пяти национальной безопасности письмо уставы, 18 U.S.C. 2709. И то, что решение это было. В детальной и тщательной 24-страничный мнению, Судья Сьюзан Illston в окружной суд Северного Округа Калифорнии методично обратился к правительства попытка обоснования для этого противоречивого внутреннего инструмента наблюдения и обнаружили, что этот закон не соответствует стандартам поселился Первой Поправке закона. Во-первых, момент для того, чтобы подчеркнуть важность этого решения. За последние десять лет, с патриотический Акт расширил свои достижения от иностранных агентов и шпионов, чтобы кто-нибудь, чья информация может быть "значимым" для национальной безопасности расследований, ФБР выпустило сотни тысяч NSLs поисках потенциально интимной информации об американцах. Сторонники NSLs часто пытались скидка неприкосновенности частной жизни и характеризуется критику как "гипербола", но реальность совершенно иная. Как Судья Виктор Марреро Южного Округа Нью-Йорка отметил в своем 2004 года Doe против Эшкрофта NSL решение, NSL статут грантов огромные, неконтролируемая сила вмешиваться в личную жизнь людей в Соединенных Штатах: ФБР, теоретически могла бы вопрос с политической кампании компьютерных систем, оператор з 2709 NSL убедительные производства имена всех лиц, адресов электронной почты через кампании компьютерных систем. ФБР теоретически может также выдавать NSL в соответствии с п. 2709, чтобы разглядеть личность человека, чьи анонимные онлайн веб-журнале или “блоге”, является критикой Правительства. Любые нормативные структуры, что дает исполнительной власти такой власти и таких пар, которые питания с возможностью скрыть свое поведение от контроля созрела для злоупотреблений. И, как мы знаем, на основе ряда внутренних расследований приказал Конгресса, этого жестокого обращения с NSLs. С пятницы мнению, право В восстановлении Национальной Безопасности Письмо, не только суд отменил это письмо, он преградил любой NSLs для телекоммуникационных провайдеров, обнаружив, что Устав был так порочен по своей сути, что она не могла стоять. Решение, вероятно, будет обжаловано, и приказ был останавливались, чтобы дать правительству время, чтобы подать апелляцию, однако федеральный районный суд заслуживает огромного кредита для не открещивается от EFF запроса и вместо того, чтобы решать наиболее сложные вопросы на голову. В этом случае, EFF образом в сильной стопам наших друзей на ACLU. В 2008 году, по поручению Николая Merrill, ACLU удалось убедить обоих в районный суд, а Второй окружной Апелляционный Суд признать серьезные структурные проблемы, с NSL статута. К сожалению, несмотря на нахождение Устава неконституционным, Второго Контура в его Доу v. Мукасей мнение одобрил продолжение использования NSLs если ФБР предприняли определенные добровольные меры, направленные на пресечение злоупотреблений. Районный суд здесь встречаются подобные конституционные недостатки, но взял эти проблемы на их законное заключение. Суд категорически отверг Второй Цепи попытки переписать Устав и полагаться на добровольные ФБР действия, чтобы исправить это, вместо того, чтобы ударить вниз. А решение лежит главным образом на недостатки, с кляпом положение, суд постановил, что положение не отделимы друг от остальных Устава и ударил в Устав во всей ее полноте. В результате, если решение будет оставлено в силе, конгресс должен вмешаться и устранить структурные дефекты, чтобы лучше защитить права по Первой Поправке, если она намерена продолжать предоставлять подобную силу ФБР. Суд сделал пять важнейших выводов. Во-первых, Судья Illston быстро отвергнута правительством опасный аргумент, что NSL получателей не имел полномочий для рассмотрения конституционности Устава. Правительство утверждало, что суд может только обсудить конкретные проблемы, связанные с определенными NSLs, что означает, что более крупные структурные проблемы с Уставом останутся нетронутыми. Как суд правильно отметил, однако, Устава, в частности позволяет суду для определения, является ли NSL "неразумно" или "незаконным", которая включает в себя определение того, самим Статутом, является неконституционным. Во-вторых, районный суд признал, что постановление недопустимо уполномочивает ФБР, чтобы ограничить речи без конституционно-в соответствии процедурные гарантии. Верховный Суд сформулировал рамки для подобной защиты в 1965 году в Фридман против Мэриленд, дело, по которому он ударил вниз, штат Мэриленд схему лицензирования, необходимые фильмов, которые будут представлены в правительство, рейтинги, доски до публичных показов. Проблема с Уставом, не обязательно его основные достижения, как это было возможно, что фильмы могут быть запрещены без нарушения Первой Поправки-если, например, они встретились Первая Поправка определение "непристойных". Вместо этого, суд был обеспокоен тем, что процедуры по удалению запрет сложил палубе против владельцы кинотеатров. Как Фридман Суд говорил в то время: Потому что цензор бизнес-это бизнес для цензора, там, пребывающей опасность, что он вполне может быть менее чувствительным, чем суд-часть независимой ветви власти-в конституционно защищаемых интересов в свободное выражение. И, если она сделана, чрезмерно обременительным, по причине задержки или иначе, на судебный пересмотр, цензора определение на практике может быть окончательным. Соответственно, когда речь обусловлено получения разрешения от правительства, закон должен быть разработан, чтобы гарантировать, что любое лицо, кляпом во рту становится быстрой, справедливой возможность оспорить это решение. В частности, Фридман Суд требует, чтобы: бремя ответственности ложится на правительство пойти в суд, чтобы получить разрешение на любой кляп какого-либо предварительного обзора кляп, должны быть строго ограничены во времени, и то время, в которое рассматривает суд должен сделать ее определения должна быть установлена на "сокращенное установленный срок, совместимый с sound судебного решения." В NSL статут явно не в Фридман тест: ФБР может кляп в NSL получатель самостоятельно и без какого-либо судебного рассмотрения, закон не заставить правительство начать обзор в случае, если объекты получателей, и нет требования, что вызов будет немедленно услышали и оценили. Как и в Фридман случае, районный суд здесь отметил, что ФБР был склонен кляп NSL получателей и Устава неправильно сложил палубе против NSL получателей, если они решили бросить вызов кляп. В-третьих, суд здесь также установлено, что Устав должен соответствовать и не смогла удовлетворить взыскательный "строгого контроля" стандарт необходимых законодательных актов, которые ограничивают свободу слова, основанных на их содержание. Строгую проверку требует, чтобы правительство кляп быть "приспособлено" для удовлетворения своих потребностей, но суд постановил что, даже если правительство мотивы были звука, он запрещал речи слишком широко для достижения этих целей: Проблема ... это, впрочем, не делает ничего, чтобы учесть тот факт, что, когда нет таких интересов национальной безопасности, существуют тысячи получателей NSLs, тем не менее, запрещено говоря о сам факт их получения NSL, оказание Устава недопустимо по широким и не приспособлено. Суд также отметил, что Устав был слишком широк в том, что он санкционировал приколами неопределенной длины, независимо от каких-либо фактических конкретная потребность во времени. В-четвертых, районный суд признал, что постановление не было "смешанный", что означает, что конгресс разработал NSL инструмента в целом и, что силы его даровано ФБР не были предназначены для функции отдельно, если одна из держав, было признано неконституционным. Потому что о неразглашении положение было признано неконституционным на его лице, сила, чтобы заставить раскрытия записей клиентов, также должны упасть. NSL статистические данные согласуются с этим замечанием: 97% всех NSLs поставляются с кляпом порядке. И, наконец, в районный суд признал, что, независимо от других недостатков, в Уставе стандарт рассмотрения нарушил разделение властей, принципы, заставляя суды отложить на ФБР определения и предотвращения независимого обзора. Он отметил, что "[с]ourt хватит только на нераскрытие на основе поиска стандарт рассмотрения." В то время как суды, в основном, отложить в исполнительной власти суда в вопросах национальной безопасности, стандарт в настоящем Уставе, требует суд рассмотрит решение правительства "окончательным" и позволяя только суд, чтобы подумать о том, что было сделано в "дурной вере". Суд правильно отметил, что реального судебного рассмотрения требует более. Суд не принимает все EFF аргументы. Под Верховного Суда плюрализма Холдинг, в New York Times v. United States-знаменитые "Бумаги Пентагона" случае-предварительные ограничения в национальном контексте безопасности может быть только оправдано, если раскрытие определенной информации "будет, несомненно, приведет косвенные, немедленные, и непоправимый вред нашей Страны и ее народа", - свидетельствует показ конкретных доказательств в суд. EFF отметил, что NSL Устава Допускается введение приколами если ФБР подтверждает на его собственные, что раскрытие информации "может" привести к каким-то неопределенным "вред" к расследованию правоохранительного органа, стандартный далеко внизу, что по документам Пентагона. О завершении предварительного ограничения, налагаемые NSL статут не составит "классический" предварительного ограничения, тем не менее, Судья Illston постановил, что такие стандарты должны быть "чрезвычайно строгий" и "слишком требовательный." Районный суд также не адрес EFF аргумент, что Устав предоставлял слишком много неограниченное усмотрение в ФБР. Даже если усмотрению правильно возложена на государственное агентство, чтобы сделать некоторые оценки, то оценка должна быть ограничена "узким, цель, и определенных стандартов", так что суд может оценить, является ли агентство, как ФБР, превышает свои полномочия.
18 Mart 2013 | Matt Zimmerman
In Derinlik: İlçe Mahkemenin Olağanüstü Düzenin Çarpıcı Aşağı NSL Tüzük Cuma günü, EFF aldı uzun bekliyor iktidar üzerindeki 2011 dilekçe kenara bir Ulusal Güvenlik Harf (NSL) yayınlanan bir telekomünikasyon şirketi. Dilekçe meydan anayasaya biri beş milli güvenlik mektubu tüzük, 18 U.S.C. 2709. Ve ne bir iktidar oldu. In bir çok detaylı ve dikkatli 24 sayfalık görüş, Yargıç Susan Illston ilçe mahkemesi, Kuzey Bölgesi için California yöntemli hitaben hükümetin teşebbüs için gerekçeler, bu tartışmalı bir iç gözetim aracı bulundu ve tüzük başarısız standartlarını karşılamak için düzenlenmiştir Birinci Değişiklik yapılmasına dair kanun. İlk olarak, bir anın önemini vurgulamak için, bu iktidar. Son on yılda beri PATRIOT Hareket genişletti ulaşmak gelen yabancı ajanların ve casus herkes kimin bilgileri olabilir "ilgili" bir ulusal güvenlik soruşturması, FBI yayınladı yüzlerce, binlerce NSLs arayan potansiyel samimi hakkında bilgi Amerikalılar. Destekçileri NSLs var sık sık girişiminde indirim gizlilik endişeleri ve var karakterize eleştiri olarak "abartı," ancak gerçek çok farklı. Yargıç olarak Victor Marrero of the New York Güney Bölgesi kaydetti onun 2004 yılmaz v. Ashcroft NSL karar, NSL tüzük hibe muazzam, kontrolsüz güç gözetlemek için içine kişilerin özel hayatına amerika Birleşik Devletleri içinde: The FBI teorik olarak olabilir issue bir politik kampanyanın bilgisayar sistem operatörü a § 2709 NSL zorlayıcı üretim isimleri olan tüm kişiler ve e-posta adresleri aracılığıyla kampanyanın bilgisayar sistemleri. The FBI teorik olarak olabilir de sorun bir NSL altında § 2709 ayırt etmek kimliğini birisi olan anonim online web günlüğü ya “blog",” kritik bir Hükümet. Herhangi bir yasal yapısı, hibe yönetim şube böyle bir güç ve çiftler güç yeteneği ile gizlemek ve gelen davranış inceleme olgun bir suistimal. Ve bildiğimiz gibi, dayalı bir dizi iç tetkikler tarafından sipariş Kongresi, bu istismarı ile oluştu NSLs. İle cuma günkü görüş başlıklı In Yeniden Ulusal Güvenlik Mektubu, değil biricik did mahkeme kenara bu özel mektup, çubuklu herhangi bir NSLs için telekomünikasyon sağlayıcıları, bulma, tüzük oldu bu yüzden doğal olarak hatalı olabilir o duramaz. Karar-ecek büyük olasılıkla var olmak, temyiz ve sipariş olmuştur kaldı sipariş vermek için hükümet dosyaya zaman bir itiraz, ancak federal bölge mahkemesi, hak muazzam kredi için değil, uzak shying EFF, alıcının talebi üzerine ve onun yerine mücadelede en zor sorunlar baş. Bu durumda olan, EFF içinde izler güçlü izinden arkadaşlarımız, ACLU. In 2008, adına Nicholas Merrill, ACLU ikna etmeyi başarmıştır hem bir bölge mahkemesi ve İkinci Devre Yargıtay kabul etmek ciddi yapısal sorunları ile NSL tüzük. Ne yazık ki, bulma rağmen tüzük anayasaya aykırı, İkinci Devre kendi Doe v. Mukasey görüşü onayladı kullanmaya devam NSLs eğer FBI üstlendi belli gönüllü önlemler geçilmesi hedefleniyor istismar. Bölge mahkemesi, burada bulunan benzer anayasa kusurları aldı ama bu sorunlar onların haklı sonuç. Mahkeme kesin bir dille reddetti İkinci Devre kalkışmak-e doğru rewrite tüzük ve itimat gönüllü FBI eylemler için bunu düzeltmek yerine, çarpıcı it down. Süre karar dinlenmiş öncelikle üzerinde başarısızlıkları ile gag hüküm, mahkeme karar verdi ki, bu hüküm oldu değil severable geri kalanından tüzük ve vurdu tüzük bütünüyle. Sonuç olarak, eğer kararı onadı, Kongre gerekir adım ve onarım yapısal kusurları daha iyi korumak için İlk Değişiklik haklarını eğer o devam etmek niyetindedir hibe benzer güç için FBI. Mahkeme yapılan beş kritik bulgular. İlk, Yargıç Illston hızlı bir şekilde reddetti, hükümetin tehlikeli bir argüman olduğunu NSL alıcıları hiçbir güç yoktu gözden anayasaya tüzük. Hükümet öne sürmüştü mahkeme could only inceleme ile özel sorunları belirli NSLs, yani daha büyük yapısal sorunların tüzük ile olur kalması. Mahkeme olarak doğru kaydetti, ancak, tüzük özellikle sağlar, bir mahkeme olup olmadığını belirlemek için bir NSL olduğunu "mantıksız" ya da "yasadışı" içeren olmadığını belirleyen tüzük kendisi anayasaya aykırı. İkinci olarak, bölge mahkemesi bulundu tüzük impermissibly yetkilendirir FBI sınırı konuşma olmadan anayasayla-zorunlu цğrencilerle. Yargıtay belden kapsamında için korumaların 1965 yılında Freedman vs Maryland olan bir durum bu, bir aşağı vurdu Maryland lisans sistemi gerekli olduğunu filmler sunulacak bir hükümet derecelendirme kurulu öncesinde kamu gösterimleri. Sorun tüzük ile mutlaka değildi onun maddi ulaşmak mümkün olduğu gibi, bu filmler banned olabilir ihlal etmeden İlk Değişiklik, - eğer, örneğin, bir araya geldiler, Birinci Değişiklik tanımı, "müstehcen"dedi. Instead, mahkeme olduğu ilgili prosedürleri için zorlu bir yasak yığılmış güverte karşı tiyatro sahipleri. Olarak Freedman Mahkeme zaman dedi ki: Çünkü sansür nin iş sansür, orada inheres tehlike o iyi olabilir daha az duyarlı daha bir mahkeme-part bağımsız bir şube hükümet biçiminden anayasayla korunan çıkarları özgür ifade. Ve eğer bu yapılan haksız yere külfetli, tarafından nedenle gecikme veya başka aramak için yargı okuyun, sansür azim mayıs uygulamada kesindir. Buna göre, burada konuşma şartına on birinci alma izni hükümet, bir tüzük için tasarlanmış olmalıdır temin eden herhangi bir kişi, kim gagged alır, hızlı, adil fırsat meydan bu kararı. Özellikle, Freedman Mahkeme gerekli ki: yükü gerekir düşmek hükümet, mahkemeye gitmek için onay almak için herhangi bir gag herhangi bir ön-inceleme gag kesinlikle olmalı, sınırlı bir zaman, ve zaman içinde olan bir gözden mahkemesi yapmak gerekir, onun tayin olması gerekir "kısa sabit dönemi ile uyumlu ses yargı kararı." Bu NSL tüzüğünde açıkça başarısız olur Freedman test: FBI can gag bir NSL alıcı ve kendi başına olmadan herhangi bir yargısal, tüzük zorlamaz başlatmak için hükümet içinde gözden olay bir alıcı nesneleri, ve there are no gereksinimleri bu bir meydan okuma olabilir derhal duydum ya değerlendirildi. Tıpkı Freedman durumda, bölge mahkemesi, burada kaydetti FBI meyilli idi gag NSL alıcıları ve tüzük yanlış bir şekilde yığılmış güverte karşı NSL alıcıları eğer onlar seçilmek-e doğru meydan gag. Üçüncü olarak, mahkeme, burada da bulunan bu tüzük karşılaması ve karşılamak için başarısız titiz "sıkı denetime" standart gerekli olan tüzük sınırlandıran konuşma içeriklerine göre. Sıkı inceleme gerektirir, hükümetin gag be "dar uyarlanmış" karşılamak, onun ihtiyaçlarını, ama mahkeme düzenlenen bu bile hükümetin motivasyonları edildi ses, o yasak konuşma çok geniş ölçüde karşılamak için, bu hedefleri: Sorun ... yani bu tüzük için hiçbir şey yok, hesap için gerçeği ne zaman böyle bir ulusal güvenlik kaygıları mevcut, binlerce alıcıları NSLs vardır yine de yasaktır dışarı konuşma hakkında sadece gerçeği onların alındığı bir NSL render, tüzük impermissibly üzerinde geniş değil, dar uyarlanmış. Mahkeme de kaydetti tüzüğünde tespit aşırı geniş, ki o yetkili gags of belirsiz uzunluğu ne olursa olsun, herhangi bir fiili belirli gerekir zamanla. Dördüncü olarak, bölge mahkemesi bulundu tüzük değildi "severable" anlamına gelen Kongre tasarlanmış NSL aracı ve bir bütün olarak bu güçlerin bunu için verilmiş FBI değildi amaçlanan fonksiyonu ayrı ayrı biri varsa ve yetkileri bulundu anayasaya aykırı. Çünkü nondisclosure hüküm bulundu anayasaya aykırı onun yüzünde, güç zorlamak açıklanması müşteri kayıtları da mutlaka düşer. NSL istatistikler tutarlı ile bu gözlem: 97% tüm NSLs ile teslim edilir gag sipariş. Son olarak, bölge mahkemesi bulundu ki, olursa olsun, diğer başarısızlıkları, tüzük s standardı okuyun ihlal kuvvetler ayrılığı ilkeleri zorlayarak kortu erteleme için FBI ' tespitler ve önlenmesi bağımsız okuyun. It olduğunu kaydetti "[c]ourt yalnızca sürdürmek nondisclosure dayanan bir arama standart et." Süre kortu yapmak büyük ölçüde erteleme için yönetim şube ' yargı, ulusal güvenlik konularında standart bu tüzüğü gereği, mahkemenin dikkate hükümetin karar "kesin" ve sadece izin veren mahkemenin olmadığını düşünmek o was made in "kötü niyet." Mahkeme haklı olduğunu kaydetti gerçek yargı denetimine daha fazla gerektirir. Mahkeme kabul etmedi tüm EFF argümanları. Altında bir yüksek Mahkeme çoğulculuk holding, New York Times v. Birleşik Devletleri -- ünlü "Pentagon Papers" harf-önce sınırlamalar milli güvenlik kapsamına olabilir sadece haklı ise, açıklanması, bazı bilgileri "kesinlikle sonuç dolaylı, derhal ve onarılamaz zarar milletimiz, ya kendi halkına," gösterdi tarafından bir gösteren özel bir delil, bir mahkeme. EFF kaydetti NSL tüzük izin empoze gags eğer FBI belgeleyen kendi başına, bu açıklama, "allah" neden bazı belirsiz "zarar" bir kolluk soruşturması, standart bir çok altında olduğunu Pentagon Papers durumda. Mesafe olduğunu önceden kısıtlama dayattığı NSL tüzük gelmediğini "klasik" önceden kısıtlama, ancak, Hakim Illston düzenlenen bu tür standartlar olurdu "olağanüstü titiz" ve "çok titiz." İlçe mahkemesi ayrıca, adres vermedi EFF argüman bu tüzük verilen çok fazla sınırsız takdirinde olmak FBI. Bile takdirine bağlı olarak, düzgün kazanılmış bir hükümet ajansı yapmak için bazı değerlendirmeler, bu değerlendirme olmalıdır kısıtlı tarafından "dar, nesnel ve kesin standartlar" böylece, mahkemenin olup olmadığını değerlendirmek, bir ajans gibi FBI aşıyor, kendi yetki.
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